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ADmINISTRATIVE LAW--ScHooL DISTRICTS-DETACHING TERRITORY--REvIEW OF
ACTION OF BOARD.-After a hearing of the petition of some of the property
owners affected, the board of county commissioners detached certain territory,
which several years before had been consolidated with district 47, and again
constituted it as school district 58. A state statute provided for an appeal from
the board's action to the district court, on the ground that it was "against the
best interests of the territory affected." Upon the appeal, two members of the
board testified that they had voted for the separation because they believed that
district 58 had never been legally consolidated with district 47. Held, that this
evidence was properly received. In re School Dist. No. 58 (1919, Minn.) 173
N. W. 850.
The universal rule is that the validity of a verdict cannot be attacked because
of the motives of the jurors. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (i9o5) sec. 2349. Nor can
the motive of legislators, in passing acts within their power, be inquired into by
the courts. Dayle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1876) 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. ed. 148.
The same rule has been extended to purely legislative acts of municipal cor-
porations. 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1911) sec. 703; Soon Hing v.
Crowley (1885) 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730. But a qualification has been made
where fraud was involved in the passage of the ordinance. Kansas City v. Hyde
(1906) 196 Mo. 498, 96 S. W. 2oi. The creation of new districts by the board
of county commissioners was a legislative act. Cf. Farrel v. County of Sibley
(1917) 35 .Minn. 439, 16I N. W. 152. The principal case extends the qualifica-
tion stated above so as to admit evidence not only of fraud, but also of erroneous
views of the law acted upon by members of the board. See Common School
Dist. 85 . Renville Co. (I918, Minn.) 17o N. W. 216, 217.
AGENCY-UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL-WARRANTY 'IN DEED--EFFECr OF STATUTE
ABOLISHING SEALS.-The defendant's son conveyed to the plaintiff a parcel of
land which contained ten acres less than specified in the deed. The plaintiff
sought to recover from the defendant, as undisclosed principal, for a breach of
warranty in the deed on the theory that the existing state statute, which abolished
seals, had done away with all distinction between ordinary written contracts and
specialties. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for breach of
warranty, with a dictum that he could have recovered in quasi-contract. Downer
v. Whitecotton (i919, Mo. App.) 212 S. W. 378.
It is generally held, in construing statutes of this nature, that merely the for-
mality of the seal is dispensed with and that they do not change the rules of law
respecting an instrument required at common law to be sealed. 8 R. C. L. 939;
Sanger v. Warren (1897) 91 Tex. 472, 44 S. W. 477. However, the Minnesota
court has held that the result of a. statute abblishing seals is to do away with
all the differences theretofore existing between simple contracts and specialties.
Streeter Co. v. Janu (19o3) go Minn. 393, 96 N. W. 1128; Efta v. Swanson
(1911) 115 Minn. 373, 132 N. W. 335. Before the enactment of such statutes,
the general rule at common law was that an undisclosed principal was not
liable on a covenant in a sealed instrument. Willard v. Wood (189o) 135 U. S.
309, IO Sup. Ct. 831; Briggs v. Partridge (1876) 64 N. Y. 357. In the instant
case, although the court intimated that the statute had abolished all distinction
[229]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
between specialties and simple contracts, at least as far as the liability of an
undisclosed principal was concerned, yet it held that an undisclosed principal
was not liable because not mentioned in the instrument. But in simple contracts,
it is not necessary that he be mentioned in the instrument. Darrow v. Home
Produce Co. (1893, D. Ind.) 57 Fed. 463; Byington v. Simpson (1883) 134 Mass.
169. However, in the instant case it was said that recovery would be allowed in
quasi-contract. Such recovery was allowed before the statute abolishing seals
was enacted. Moore v. Granby Mining Co. (1883) 8o Mo. 86. Had the court
followed the Minnesota rule in the present case, the measure of damages would
have included the expense to the plaintiff of defending the title against his
vendee, to whom the plaintiff had made the same warranty that the defendant
made, whereas in quasi-contract only the value of the land could be recovered.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-FORUM v. ENACTING JURIS-
DICTION-CONCURRENT STATE LAWS CREATING AN INTERSTATE TOLL-BRIDGE COR-
PORATION.-A corporation was organized under the laws of New Hampshire with
authority to construct a toll-bridge between Cornish, N. H., and Windsor, Vt.,
and to collect certain specified tolls. Subsequently, the legislature of Vermont
confirmed the rights of the grantees, granting "the same rates of toll which are
granted to them by the action of the legislature of New Hampshire." In Turn-
pike Co. v. Peru (1917) 91 Vt. 295, Io At. 679, this grant was construed not
to authorize the collection of tolls from motor vehicles. Thereafter, the corpora-
tion brought an action in New Hampshire to recover tolls for motor traffic
"arising" in Vermont. Held, that the Vermont decision should be disregarded
and the toll charges upheld. Proprietors of Cornish Bridge v. Fitts (I919,
N. H.) io7 Atl.'626.
In the principal case the law of Vermont was assumed to be primarily applic-
able to the contract as such. It may be inferred, therefore, that the liability to
toll, if any, became complete by virtue of acts occurring in that state. The case
did not, however, require a determination of this point, inasmuch as the prin-
ciples of contract law, whatever the jurisdiction, could afford but one relevant
rule concerning the validity of the toll, namely, that a corporation whose mode
of contracting is prescribed by the law of the incorporation may contract in no
other mode than that thus prescribed. Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839, U. S.)
13 Pet. 519; St. Louis V. & T. H. Ry. v. T. H. & L R. R. (1892) 145 U. S. 393,
12 Sup. Ct. 953. The plaintiff, however, was incorporated under the laws of
both New Hampshire and Vermont, and the laws of both states prescribed toll
charges. The requirements of both laws must be satisfied unless the case
admitted of a severance of the corporate personalities created by the respective
states for the purpose of predicating legal consequences in each state. Such a
severance, irrespective of any theory concerning the single or dual character of
the product of a dual incorporation, was clearly inadmissible in the principal
case, since the joint authorization of both the incorporating states was indis-
pensable to the power of the corporation with respect either to charges of toll
or to exemptions from such charges. Covington & C. Bridge Co. v,. Kentucky
(1894) i54 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087; Chesapeake etc. Canal Co. v. Baltimore
& 0. Ry. (1832, Md.) 4 Gill & J. I; Fisk /. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. (1868,
Sup. Ct. N. Y.) 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 378; Cleveland & Pittsburg Ry. v. Speer (867)
56 Pa. St. 325; New Orleans, M. & T. Ry. v. Miss. (1884) 112 U. S. 12, 5 Sup.
Ct. i9. A divergence on this point be ween the states would, it seems, in the
absence of congressional action, result in the closing of the bridge to motor
traffic. The constitution of the United States protects against such a divergence
resulting from separate legislative amendment. Covington & C. Bridge Co.,
supra. Constitutional limitations, however, do not meet the case of a divergence,
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through judicial construction, of complementary state laws which were intended
to be uniform. Railroad v. McClure (187i, U. S.) io Wall. 511. The court in
the principal case was therefore constrained either to follow the Vermont deci-
sion, contrary to its own opinion, as an authority for New Hampshire law, or
to declare that the Vermont court had misconstrued the Vermont law, or to
concede the existence of a legislative divergence between the states which must
be productive of infinite complications. The second alternative was properly
chosen. The widely recognized rule that the court of the forum should follow
statutory constructions adopted by the highest courts of the enacting state is a
principle, not of constitutional law, but of the conflict of laws. Wiggins' Ferry
Co. v. Chicago & A. Ry. (1882, C. C. E. D. Mo.) ii Fed. 381; Johnson v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. (19o3) 187 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 194; Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass/n
v. Williamson (19o3) i89 U. S. 122, 23 Sup. Ct. 527. Like all principles of
conflict of laws it need not be followed to a practical result repugnant to the
policy of the forum. Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1864, U. S.) i Wall. 175. Cf. Jessup
v. Carnegie (i88o) 8o N. Y. 44i; cf. Auld v. Cant (1914) 216 Mass. 381, 103
N. E. 933; cf. Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. Capital Ins. Co. (igoo) iix Iowa,
590, 82 N. W. 1O23. To have followed the ordinary rule in the principal case,
would have involved either a renunciation of the court's function in construing
its own law, or the practical nullification of a part of that law. Moreover the
decision which it was asked to follow obviously turned upon a misconstruction
of the law of the forum, and was therefore seriously discredited as evidence of
the law of the foreign state.
CONTRACTS-ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS TO BEQUEATH-GIFS-sBy an ante-
nuptial agreement, the testator promised to leave by will to his wife a share of
his estate equal to that to be left by will to each of his children by a former
marriage. The wife promised to accept such a provision in lieu of all her claims,
as widow, on the estate. After the marriage a will was drawn according to the
antenuptial agreement. During his lifetime, the testator made large gifts for the
purpose of diminishing his wife's expectancy. After his death, the executors of
his will brought a bill in equity to enjoin the widow from petitioning for a
widow's allowance. Held, that the injunction should not be issued. Eaton v.
Eaton (igig, Mass.) I24 N. E. 37.
It is well settled that antenuptial agreements to alter the interest which the
parties would have in the property of each by the law of the marriage status
are valid, if both parties exercise good faith. Kroell v. Kroell (905) 219 Ill.
105, 76 N. E. 63; Rankin v. Schiereck (1914) 166 Iowa, io, 147 N. W. i8o. And
if the ddceased spouse has performed his part of such an agreement, it will be
enforced specifically against the surviving spouse. Paine v. Hollister (1885)
139 Mass. 144, 29 N. E. 541; Thompson v. Tucker-Osborn (1897) ii Mich. 470,
69 N. W. 73o; cf. also (1919) 28 YAtm LAW JouRAL, 7o9. However, in the
absence of a contract or statute, a husband is privileged to give'away, during
his lifetime, all of his personal property, without the consent of his wife, and
for the purpose of preventing her from acquiring any portion of it. Trabbic
v. Trabbic (i9o5) 142 Mich. 387, 1O5 N. W. 876; Roberson v. Roberson (19o5)
147 Ala. 311, 40 So. io4. Furthermore, a husband is privileged to make reason-
able gifts during his lifetime, even though duty bound by an antenuptial contract
to leave all of his property to his wife. Dickinson v. Seaman (igo8) I93 N. Y.
18, 85 N. E. 818. But in the instant case the gifts were not reasonable and were
inconsistent with the- exercise of good faith. Therefore, it is believed that the
decision is sound. For similar protection of a widow's dower rights against
fraudulent conveyance by her husband in contemplation of marriage see (i919)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 701.
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CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-UsE OF TRADE NAmE.-The plaintiffs, manu-
facturers of motion picture films, engaged the defendant, an actor of almost no
experience, to work for them on contracts from year to year. Each yearly con-
tract provided that he should act under the name of Stewart Rome while em-
ployed by the plaintiffs, but that he should never use that name when not acting
for them. After three years with the plaintiffs, during which time he became
famous as the actor, Stewart Rome, the defendant left for war serv.ice. On his
return he was engaged by a rival firm and immediately proceeded to act under
the name of Stewart Rome. The plaintiffs brought this action to restrain him
from using that name. Held, that an injunction should not be granted. Hep-
worth Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Wernharn Ryott (1gig, Eng. Ch.) 121 L. T.
Rep. 226.
The decision in the instant case was based on the-ground that the contract was
void as an illegal restraint of trade. Contracts not to use a firm name have been
loosely classed as not in restraint of trade. Vernon v. Hallam (1886) 34 Ch. D.
748. But it is clear that the purpose and the effect of such a contract is to
restrain trade, whatever the device used. The real holding is that it is not an
illegal restraint of trade. The same seems to be true of the instant case. The
question is whether such a restraint is illegal. The accepted rule is that a con-
tract in partial restraint, like that in the instant case, must be unreasonable before
it will be held illegal. Maxim-Nordenfeldt Gun Co. v. Nordenfeldt [1893] I Ch.
630, [1894] A. C. 535; Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co. (19o2, C. C. A.
7th) 116 Fed. 304. Similar considerations lie at the root of the rules on agree-
ments to obtain contracts from the government. See (igig) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 502. Certain kinds of contracts are held reasonable or unreasonable
"as a matter of law." Covenants not to use a firm name, mentioned above, are
one class almost analogous to that in the instant case. But it is evident that the
defendant's covenant, not being made to protect a sale of good-will, is not suf-
ficiently similar to justify a classification with such contracts; for in the instant
case, unless the defendant uses the name Stewart Rome, it will be of no benefit
to anyone, whereas, in the sale of good-will, the name is in constant use. Another
type of contract, similar to the one in the instant case, is that of the physician's
assistant not to practice in the vicinity of the physician who has instructed him.
Such contracts are held valid, probably in order not to discourage such instruc-
tion. Freudenthal v. Espey (9o9) 45 Colo. 488, io2 Pac. 28o. 'In the instant
case, the employer has incurred expense in training the actor, in marketing the
productions, in advertising, and in building up a reputation for the actor. The
question is, therefore, whether the actor shall be kept free from a condition of
servitude or the employer shall be protected in his investment. If the instant
case be followed, the training of actors might be discouraged, since the employers
would not be protected, as are the doctors in the above mentioned cases. Never-
theless, the principal case has taken what seems the preferable view. It is to be
noted that the defendant's contract, unlike the physician's assistant, prevented the
use of the name Stewart Rome anywhere.
EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMoNY-BAsIS.-The plaintiff sued to recover damages
for blindness, alleged to have been caused by an electrical flash which was the
result of the defendant's negligence. A certain physician had examined the plain-
tiff after this suit was instituted, but had never treated him. He was permitted to
testify, as an expert witness, that the plaintiff was totally blind in his left eye,
basing his opinion, in part, upon the statements which the plaintiff had made to
him. Held, that the admission of this evidence was error. Bell v. Milwaukee
Electric Ry. & Light Co. (1919, Wis.) 172 N. W. 791.
The weight of authority requires that the facts upon which an expert's opinion
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is based shall be stated or appear in evidence before his opinion is given. Raub
v. Carpenter (19O2) 187 U. S. 159, 23 Sup. Ct. 72; Williams v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co. (1917) 257 Pa. St. 354, ioi Atl. 748. The basis for this rule is that
the jury will thus be enabled to determine whether or not the facts upon which
the opinion is predicated are correct, and to permit other experts to pass on the
same facts. But it has been indicated that the rule rests upon an incorrect theory
and usurps the province of cross examination. See (917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
502. Most jurisdictions exclude, as hearsay evidence, statements to a physician
during an examination if made in order that he will be able to testify. 3 Wig-
more, Evidence (i9o5) sec. 1721. However, an opinion partly based on the state-
ments of the injured person as to present symptoms is generally admitted. 1 ibid.,
sec. 688. But not if based entirely on such statements, when they are made out of
court. People v. Ebanks (1897) 117 Calif. 652, 49 Pac. 1049. It is submitted that
the conclusion reached in the principal case is not desirable. It is probably the
result of combining the rule requiring the facts upon which the expert opinion is
based to be stated, with the rule excluding, as hearsay evidence, statements made
during an examination to a physician for the purpose of securing his testimony.
But the latter rule did not apply, because such statements, when given as the
foundation of an opinion, do not have hearsay quality. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
v. Jackson (1917, Okla.) 162 Pac. 823. The strict enforcement of the rule of the
principal case would practically prohibit expert testimony in such cases, because
the statements of the patient, as to present symptoms, at least, are a necessary
element of the expert's opinion.
EvIDENcE-FOOTPRINTS-WHEN ADMISSIILE TO PROVE I.ENTITY.-In a trial for
murder the county attorney was permitted to testify that he had seen footprints
near the scene of the killing, that he had requested the defendant to show him his
boots, and that, in his opinion, the tracks were made by the defendant's boots.
Held, that the evidence was too indefinite and its admission was error. Burk-
halter v. State (1919, Tex. Cr. App.) 212 S. W. 163.
Footprints are a species of "identity evidence." When offered to show that an
act must have been done by some human being, there can be no doubt as to their
admissibility. State v. Daniels (1904) 134 N. C. 641, 46 S. E. 743; see Leonard v.
State (1907) 15o Ala. 89, 93, 43 So. 214, 216. But when offered to show that an
act must have been done by a particular human being, the rule of admission
narrows. At best, such evidence requires an indirect mode of inference, since
"rarely can one circumstance alone be so inherently peculiar to a single object."
i Wigmore, Evidence (1904) sec. 411. An actual measurement of both shoe and
footprint or a physical comparison by super-position is usually required. Bal-
lenger v. State (1911) 63 Tex. Cr. Rep. 657, 141 S. W. 91; State v. Harrold
(1866) 38 Mo. 496. The opinion of the witness as to the identity is inadmissible.
Dubose v. State (19o6) 148 Ala. 56o, 42 So. 862; State v. Green (1893) 40 S. C.
328, 18 S. E. 933; but see State v. Ancheta (1915) 20 N. M. 19, 27, 145 Pac. io86,
io88. When the witness is the makei of the shoes his opinion is admissible on
the ground, it would seem, that it is expert testimony. Newton v. State (1912)
65 Tex. Cr. Rep. 87, 143 S. W. 638. There is a conflict of authority as to when
the procurement of such evidence violates the defendant's immunity from self-
incrimination. When the defendant voluntarily submits to the comparison, as in
the principal case, there is clearly no violation. Webb v. State (1914) I1 Ala.
App. 123, 65 So. 845; State v. Sir-may (1912) 40 Utah, 525, 122 Pac. 748. But
when he is coerced or ordered to submit to the comparison, the evidence has been
held inadmissible. Elder v. State (I I5) 143 Ga. 363, 85 S. E. 97; see State
v. Sirmay, supra, 536. However, the better view is that the immunity from self-
incrimination extends only to testimonial utterances. State v. McIntosh (1913)
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94 S. C. 439, 78 S. E. 327; State v. Graham (1876) 74 N. C. 646; State v.
Thompson (1912) i6i N. C. 238, 76 S. E. 249; see (i918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
412; see also (igig) 28 ibid., 703.
NEGLIGENCE-CFRTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS.-The defendants were certified
public accountants and as such audited the books and accounts of a certain
company. The plaintiff purchased stock in the company, relying, upon the
defendant's audit, which was shown to him by a tlird party. The plaintiff and
this third party were both strangers to the contract of accounting between the
defendants and the company. The defendants had been negligent in their audit
and the plaintiff suffered loss thereby, as the stock was in fact worthless, con-
trary to the figures of the defendant's audit. The plaintiff sued in an action of
trespass for the damages resulting to him from this negligence. Held, that the
plaintiff could not recover because the defendants were not liable to anyone not
a party to the contract for the accounting. Landell v. Lybrand (igig, Pa.) lO7
At]. 783.
In the principal case, the defendants owed the plaintiff no contractual duty.
But courts realize that in some similar cases of negligence, a contractual duty is
unnecessary to support an action; and have allowed recovery by third persons
where the negligence was such that it was inherently dangerous, 'and the resulting
damage was reasonably forseeable by ordinarily prudent men. Wolcho v. Rose,-
blth (19o8) 81 Conn. 358, 71 Atl. 566; 'see COMMENT (1918) 27 YA.E LAW
JOURNAL, 1o68. The principal case seems to be in accord with the existing law,
but its justice and expediency are questionable.; It has been held that certified
public accountants constitute a skilled professional class and are liable for neg-
ligence to one who employs them. Smith v. London Assurance Corporation
(I9O5) 1O9 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. Supp. 82o. Stock companies are accustomed
to advertise, as an assurance of their good standing, that certain named public
accountants have audited their books and accounts and have certified to their
financial standing. Public expediency demands, aside from the criminal aspect,
that accountants who have been guilty of fraud in such cases should be held liable
to one who, relying in good faith upon their certified audit as they intended he
should, bought stock and thereby suffered loss. Furthermore, it seems that public
accountants, who are recognized as a responsible class in the business world,
should be compelled to exercise due care in their audits; upon which, as can be
reasonably forseen, many strangers may act. And all the more so, because -they
have the election to contract or not. However, an attorney who acted in good
faith has been held not liable to third persops in an action of tort for negligence.
Campbell v. Brozwn (1876, C. C. W. D. Tex.) 2 Woods, 349. But an attorney
cannot reasonably be expected to forsee that strangers will probably act on his
advice, for experience shows otherwise. And this reasoning seems to apply also
to cases of physicians, because a doctor prescribes for a particular patient and
does not intend, nor is it reasonably probable, that third parties will rely and act
upon his advice to this particular patient. But neither of these classes of cases
conflicts with the proposition that public accountants should be held liable to
third parties for negligence, when it is reasonably forseeable that third parties
may act upon their audits. And if the courts will not impose this duty to the
public, then it is submitted that this is a case for legislative enactment.
NEGLIGENC--CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTs.-The plain-
tiff was employed to run an elevator in violation of a statute which provided that
no child under sixteen years of age should be employed or permitted to operate
an elevator. The plaintiff was injured while so employed and sued for personal
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injuries. The court charged the jury that if the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, he could not recover. Held, that this instruction was erroneous,
because an action for injuries arising in the course of such prohibited employ-
ment cannot be defeated by the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Karpeles v.
Heine (igg, N. Y.) 124 N. E. Ioi.
The legislature contemplated a special danger to children working in industries
because of the characteristics incident to their immaturity, and this was one of
the chief purposes of forbidding their employment in industrial establishments.
Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Mach. Co. (199o) 225 Pa. St. 348, 74 AtI. 215. Many
cases have held that where a child is injured while employed in an industry in
violation of a statute, contributory negligence is no defence. De Soto Coal
Mining & Development Co. v. Hill (1912) 179 Ala. 186, 6o So. 583; Lenahan v.
Pittston Coal Mining Co. (19o7) 218 Pa. St. 311, 67 Ati. 642; American Car &
Foundry Co. v. Armentraut (9o5) 214 Ill. 509, 73 N. E. 766. If a statute pro-
hibiting the employment of minors in dangerous industries not only creates a
civil but also a criminal liability, the employment has been classed with ordinary
acts of gross negligence, and the general rule applied that where the defendant
is guilty of gross negligence, contributory negligence of the person injured is
immaterial. Leora v. Minn. St. P. & S. S. Marie Ry. (1914) 156 Wis. 386, 146
N. W. 52o. On the other hand, many cases have taken the moderate view that
employment of a child under a certain age, in violation of a statute, is negligence
in the employer and will exclude him from the defence of contributory negli-
gence, unless it be shown that the child had experience and intelligence, not-
withstanding his age, to enable him to appreciate and avoid the dangers of
service. Norman v. Virginia Pocahontas Coal Co. (I91O) 68 W: Va. 405, 69
S. E. 857; Beghold v. Auto Body Co. (i9o7) 149 Mich. 14, 112 N. W. 691; 12
L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, note. This is properly a question for the jury. Sterling v.
Union Carbide Co. (19o5) 142 Mich. 284, 105 N. W. 755; Rolin v. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. (i9o6) 141 N. C. 300, 53 S. E. 891. Finally, the extreme view has
been held that the rule requiring the plaintiff, in an action for negligence, to
show due care on his part is the same in actions brought under a statute as at
common law, unless the statute itself provides otherwise. Taylor v. Carew Mfg.
Co. (1887) 143 Mass. 470, IO N. E. 308. It has been held that Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts do not affect such a statute as the one in the principal case. See
(IgIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 509. It would seem that the moderate view
should be applied in most cases, except where the intent of the statute was to
impose absolute liability for its violation, irrespective of contributory negligence.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-SOLDIER UNDER ORDER.-The plaintiff.
a private in the United States Army, was ordered to guard a bridge on I ie
defendant's railroad. He was directed to walk up and down a four foot space
between the two tracks, but, if a train approached, to step onto the track which
remained clear. While he was on duty with these directions, a train approached.
He stepped onto the other track, which appeared clear, and was hit by an express
train coming from the other direction. He sued the railroad company for the
injuries which resulted. The trial court held that he was guilty of contributory.
negligence in failing to step into the intermediate space instead of onto the other
track, and withheld the case from the jury. Held, that this ruling of the court
was erroneous. Kelly et al. v. Pennsylzania R. R. (igig, Pa.) XO7 Ati. 780.
A soldier is liable to court martial for wilful disobedience of a lawful order
or command of a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. A. W. 64, 65.
Orders to commit treason or certain other kinds of crimes are, of course, unlaw-
ful and inoperative. United States v. Greiner (1861, U. S. D. Pa. E. D.) 4 Phila.
396. The same is true of orders issued without regularly constituted authority.
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United States v. Carr (1872, C. C. S. D. Ga.) i Woods, 480. But the order in the
instant case is clearly not unlawful on either of these grounds. It might be
attacked as an example of bad judgment, but no cases have been found which
hold an order illegal on that account. Proof of an order from a superior mili-
tary officer is a defence to a criminal prosccution, unless that order be inoperative
for the reasons mentioned above. Clark v. State (1867) 37 Ga. 191. It will
excuse a violation of a municipal ordinance. State v. Burton (igiS, R. I.) 103
Atl. 962, (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 61. A fortiori it is a justification in a
civil suit. Trammell v. Bassett (1866) 24 Ark. 499. The better rule seems to be
that even when the order was given without authority it is a good justification,
unless palpably illegal or unauthorized. McCall v. McDowell (1867, C. C. D.
Calif.) i Abb. 212. But good faith does not always excuse an inferior under
direct orders. Ferguson v. Loar (I869) 68 Ky. 689. And where there is only a
permission, or discretion is otherwise possible, good faith is immaterial. Mitchell
v. Harmony (1849) 54 U. S. 115. But these findings do not affect the rule that
where there is a direct lawful order there is no civil liability. As to the question
of possible contributory negligence in the exact performance of an explicit com-
mand, no cases in point have been found. The inference seems strong, however,
that no performance in obedience to a lawful order would bar recovery. Every
consideration for the protection of the private soldier which has prompted the
decisions holding him immune from criminal prosecutions and civil suits would
oppose holding his performance of a military duty a bar to recovery froih a
negligent defendant. It should be noted that the court considered at some length
the position of the plaintiff as an implied invitee on the defendant's bridge.
PROPERTY-COVENANT OF WAR ANTY-CLouD ON TiwL.-The plaintiff, having
conveyed certain lands by a warranty deed to the defendant, sued to recover the
purchase price. The defendant set up a counter-claim for breach of warranty of
title, on the ground that a prior vendee of* this land held an unenforceable deed
for it. The defendant was aware of the existence of this deed at the date of
the sale, but accepted her deed upon the representation of the plaintiff that the
land was free from incumbrance. Held, that no recovery could be had on the
counter-claim, since the unenforceable deed was only a cloud on the plaintiff's
title and there was, therefore, no breach of the covenant of warranty. Reed et al.
v. Steven et al. (1919, Conn.) lO7 At1. 495.
It is generally stated that a breach of a.covenant of warranty of title does not
occur until actual eviction of the grantee by one holding a title paramount.
Tropico Land & Improvement Co. v. Lambourn (1915) 170 Calif. 33, 148 Pac.
206. When the grantee yields to the adverse claimant without suit, he has the
burden of proving that the adverse title to which he yielded was valid and para-
mount. McKellop v. Burton's Adtn. (9o9) 82 Vt. 403, 74 Atl. 78. Hence the
question naturally arises as to the effect of an eviction of the grantee in a law
suit under a deed valid on its face, but in fact null and void. By the great
weight of authority, which was followed by the court in the principal case, the
mere existence of such a deed is not a breach of the covenant, and no recovery
can be had for the expense of removing the cloud from the grantee's title.
Luther v. Brown (1896) 66 Mo. App. 227. Nor can the grantee recover the
expenses of a successful defence against such a deed. Rittmaster v. Richner
(19oo) I4 Colo. App. 361, 6o Pac. 189; MacKenzie v. Clement (igio) 144 Mo.
App. 114, 129 S. W. 730. It seems, however, that an unsuccessful defence of an
action on the deed does constitute a breach of the covenant. Cf. Tropico Land &
Improvement Co. v. Lambourn, supra.
RECENT CASE NOTES
PROPERTY-PERSONALTY AND REALTY-MUSSELS AND SHELL-FIsH.--The defend-
ant removed a large quantity of mussels growing in a natural bed in a river
whose bed was there owned by the plaintiff. The latter sued to recover damages
for the taking, and in order to bring the case within a statute allowing treble
damages for digging up any material which was a part of the realty, alleged that
the mussels were such. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover, as mussels
were not a part of realty within the meaning of the statute, and also, they being
ferae naturae, the plaintiff had no "property" in them. Gratz v. McKee et al.
(i919, C. C. A. 8th) 258 Fed. 335.
The question whether animals ferae naturae are realty or personalty depends
first upon whether or not they are "property" at all. There are two views as
to this: one, that they are the property of the state in its sovereign capacity
until reduced to possession by an individual who then becomes the owner; the
other that they are not owned by the state or any individual, but belong to the
one who reduces them to possession. See Geer v. Connecticut (i896) i6i U. S.
519, 529, 539, I6 Sup. Ct. 6oo, 6o4, 6o8. These views can in part be reconciled;
both the state and the individual have some of the incidents of "property."
"Property" in the state seems to consist only in the power to make treaties as to
the things in question and to regulate the conditions under which the individual's
power of capture may be exercised. Cf. United States v. Samples (igig, W. D.
Mo.) 258 Fed. 479; cf. McCready v. Virginia (1876) 94 U. S. 391. Generally,
each individual has a privilege and power to become the owner by reducing the
animal to possession. But some difficulty arises in determining whether animals
whose situs is quasi-permanent fall under the head of realty or personalty. The
few cases on this subject that have been found indicate such property is per-
sonalty. Mussels, like oysters, are shell-fish, and should have the same status.
Cultivated oysters are treated as personalty in that they may be the subject of
larceny. People v. Morrison (i9O9) 194 N. Y. i75, 86 N. E. 12o. And they
may be converted. Vroom 'v. Tilly (i9o6) 184 N. Y. i68, 77 N. E. 24.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-NEw PROMISE-BY NEwsPAPER PUBLICATION.-
Pending final adjudication of the validity of a state act to regulate freight rates
within the state, the defendant railroad charged the plaintiff higher rates than
those fixed by the act. The act was later held valid and the defendant published
a notice that it would make prompt payment of properly supported claims arising
from the overcharge. The statute of limitations had run against the plaintiff's
claim before publication of this notice. He presented his claim, but the defend-
ant refused to pay. The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the overcharge.
Held, that he was entitled to recover because the promise by publication started
a new period of limitation. Big Diamond Milling Co. v. Chicago, M. St. P. Ry.
(igg, Minn.) 171 N. W. 799.
It is universally held that in order to start a new period of limitation the old
debt must be acknowledged as presently existing. Custy v. Donlan (1893) 159
Mass: 245, 34 N. E. 36o; Russell & Co. v. Davis (189) 51 Minn. 482, 53 N. W.
766. There must, in addition, be an express promise to pay the debt or circum-
stances from which such a promise may fairly be implied. Moore v. Bank of
Columbia (1832, U. S.) 6 Pet. 86; Levy v. Popper (I9o5) io6 App. Div. 394,
94 N. Y. Supp. 9o5. Furthermore, the new promise must identify the debt.
Anderson v. Nystrom (i9o8) IO3 Minn. i68, 114 N. W. 742; Pierce v. Merrill
(i9oo) 128 Cal. 473, 61 Pac. 67. But the cases vary as to when this identity is
established. Cf. Thompson v. French (1837, Tenn.) 1o Yerg. 452; Belcher v.
Tacoma Eastern Ry. (ig7) 99 Wash. 34, i68 Pac. 782. The authorities are
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also divided as to whether the suit is "upon" the old debt or on the new promise.
Re Salmon (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 249 Fed. 3oo; Richardson v. Bricker (1883) 7
Colo. 58, I Pac. 433; cf. COMMENT (1gIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817. The
power of the debtor to make the new terms conditional, to become bound for
part only of the old debt, and the fact that he is not liable for each installment
until the set dates, when the new promise is to pay in installments, tend to prove
that the action is "on" the new promise. Cf. Batchelder v. Batchelder (1868)
48 N. H. 23; cf. Wiley v. Brown (1894) 18 R. I. 615, 3o Atl. 464; cf. Shaw v.
Newell (1851) I R. I. 488. The decision in the principal case seems sound and
the result is satisfactory. For the effect of an addition by the legislature to the
statutory period of limitation, see COMMENT (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 91.
SuRrYsHiP-GuARANTY-AccEPTANCF--No'rlcE.-The defendant, by a writing
"in consideration of the sum of one dollar and other valuable considerations, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged," guaranteed the prompt payment of all
purchases up to the amount of $25,ooo made and to be made by the Rothacker
Rubber Company from the plaintiff. The guaranty was expressed to be continu-
ing and to be terminable only by notice by the guarantor. The plaintiff sued to
recover the amount of unpaid purchases, which was less than the amount guar-
anteed. Held, that he could not recover, because there was no averment of
notice of acceptance of the guaranty. Ajax Rubber Co. v. Gain (igig, Del.
Super. Ct.) 1O5 Atl. 834.
Where a "guaranty" is merely an offer, not made at the request of the guar-
antee, notice is generally held necessary to bind the guarantor at all. Davis
Sewing Machine Co. v. Richards (1885) 115 U. S. 524, 6 Sup. Ct. 173; Balfour v.
Knight (1917) 86 Ore. 165, 167 Pac. 484. But where the "guaranty" embodies
a complete contract, it is binding upon the guarantor without notice. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Riefler (1915) 239 U. S. 7, 36 Sup. Ct. 12;
Great Western Mfg. Co. v. Porter (1918) 103 Kan. 84, 172 Pac. lo18. Nor is
notice held to be necessary where the "guaranty" is made upon the request of
the guarantee. Peck v. Precision Mch. Co. (1917, Ga. Ct. App.) 93 S. E. io6.
Likewise with a guaranty which, as in the principal case, recites consideration
already received from the guarantee. Davis v. Wells (i88i) 104 U. S. 159;
Emerson Mfg. Co. v. Tved. (igog) ig N. D. 8, 12o N. W. lO94. In view of
these holdings, it is submitted that the principles of offer and acceptance in the
formation of contracts underlie such cases. See Corbin, Offer and Acceptance
(1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 169, 173. A recent contract case is clearly analo-
gous to the instant case. A contract-made for a consideration-to supply any
quantity of flasks ordered by the customer at a certain price was held binding.
Koehler & Hinrichs Mercantile Co. v. Illinois Glass Co. (1919, Minn.) 173 N. W.
7o3. In the principal case the contract is that the defendant shall be secondarily
liable for debts of the principal to the plaintiff up to a certain amount. Both
situations have all the elements of a binding option. See COMMENT (1918)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 65 . And it is believed that the court erred in requiring
notice'to bind the defendant. For it seems that the furnishing of a "guaranty"
upon request of the guarantee is an acceptance by the guarantor of the guar-
antee's offer, and that a valid contract is thereby formed. Cf. Peck v. Precision
Mch. Co., supra. And the recital of consideration paid is not merely evidence
of consideration for the guarantor's promise, but also evidence of the offer which
is thereby accepted. This is shown by the fact that (if th~re was some other
consideration) no notice is required, although the particular recited consideration
was not in fact given. See Lawrence v. McCalmont (1844, U. S.) 2 How. 426,
452; see Bond v. Farwell Co. (igog, C. C. A. 6th) 172 Fed. 58, 6r. However, it
has been held that such a "guaranty" is an offer for a unilateral contract to be
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accepted by the advance of credit by the guarantee, and that notice is only a
condition precedent to a suit against the guarantor. Bishop v. Eaton (1894)
I61 Mass. 496, 37 N. E. 665; Somersall v. Barneby (1611, K. B.) Cro. Jac. 287;
Powers v. Bumcratz (i86i) 12 Oh. St. 273. This view seems sound wherever
a "guaranty" is not an acceptance, for consideration received at the time, of an
offer by the guarantee, as above indicated. Some cases have held that notice is
necessary to bind a "guarantor," but not a "surety." Homewood People's Bank
v. Hastings (1919, Pa.) io6 At. 308; Hess v. Watkins Medical Co. (igg, Ind.
App. Ct.) 123 N. E. 44o. But no satisfactory criterion for the classification of
"sureties" and "guarantors" was advanced, and such a division seems super-
fluous and unsound
ToRTs-FRAUD AND DECEIT-LImiTATION OF ACTIONS-DAMAGES.-The defend-
ant fraudulently doncealed and misrepresented the actual facts which resulted in
the death of the plaintiff's husband. As a result, the plaintiff did not sue during
the period in which the wrongful death statute allowed an action. Having sub-
sequently discovered the fraud of the defendant and that she had once had a
good cause of action, the plaintiff sued in deceit for the resulting damages. Held,
that she was entitled to recover, because the damages were not speculative and
the limitation by the statute for wrongful death was no bar to an action in
deceit. Desmaris v. People's Gaslight Co. (1919, N. H.) 1O7 Atl. 491.
The principal case was not governed by the wrongful death statute, because
suit within two years after death is made a condition precedent by that statute to
the right to recover. Poff v. Telephone Co. (1903) 72 N. H. 164, 55 AtI. 891;
De Martino v. Siemnon (I916) go Conn. 527, 97 Atl. 765. In this action of deceit
the plaintiff had to prove that she had once had a claim under the wrongful
death statute; that the defendants made false representations; that these pre-
vented her from the action under the statute; and that she had suffered damages
thereby. The plaintiff's damages were the value of the lost claim. See Ochs v.
Woods (I917) 221 N. Y. 335, 341, 117 N. E. 305, 307; see Urtz v. N. Y. C. &
H. R. R. R. (I911) 2o2 N. Y. 170, i81, 95 N. E. 711, 714. These damages were
not speculative. Alexander v. Church (1885) 53 Conn. 561, 4 At. 1O3. The
reason appears to be that the jury would determine and award the value of the
lost claim, and not the amount of damages a jury hearing the original cause of
action would have given. However, such damages have been held speculative,
in what appears to be a very unsatisfactory decision. Whitman v. Seaboard
Air Line Co. (1917, S. C.) 92 S. E. 861. It is not a condition precedent to the
plaintiff's recovery in such cases that he investigate the truth of the defendant's
representations; he is protected in relying on them without investigation. Laird
v. Keithley (1918, Mo.) 2o S. W. 1138. The reasoning in the principal case
seems sound, and the result reached is desirable and just. Other courts might
well follow this case in order that such a statutory limitation may not be misused
to work injustice.
TORTs-LIBEL-SEONDARY PUBLICATION.-One of two defendants claimed that
he was liable only for-secondary, and not primary, publication of a libel. An
instruction was given that, if the jury found for the plaintiff, it should assess
certain specified damages, including an item for injuries resulting from the
original publication. Held, that the instruction was erroneous. Sourbier v.
Brown (igig, Ind.) 123 N. E. 8o2.
In the instant case, secondary publication is used in a limited sense to mean
the exhibition of an original libelous article. This term, however, is generally
used to mean the distribution of copies of a libel. It seems well settled that
YALE LAW JOURNAL
such distribution is considered a fresh publication, and that the publisher is guilty
of making a new and distinct libel. Woods v. Pangburn (1878) 75 N. Y. 495;
Bigelow v. Sprague (1886) 14o Mass. 425, 5 N. E. i44; Newell, Slander and
Libel (3d ed. 1914) 299; cf. COMMENT (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAl, 308. This
same rule of law logically applies to the term as used in the instant case, although
there is no direct authority. It has been held that in giving currency to libelous
reports and publications, a party is as much responsible as if he had originated
the defamation. Staub v. Van Benthuysen (1884) 36 La. Ann. 467. Inasmuch
as a secondary publication is a fresh and distinct libel, which is in no way legally
connected with the original libel, it follows that the maker of a secondary pub-
lication of libelous matter is not responsible for the results of the primary pub-
lication in which he did not participate. This point, it seems, has never been
raised before, but is an obviously reasonable conclusion.
TORTs-NuISANCE-SuccESslvE AcTros.-The defendant had for ten years con-
tinuously operated a cement factory at a short distance from the plaintiff's home.
Large quantities of dust had been blown, whenever the wind was in the proper
direction, from the defendant's factory upon the land of the plaintiff, who sought
to recover damages for the resulting personal inconvenience. The defendant
admitted the nuisance, but claimed that since it was of a "permanent" nature,
only one action could be brought, and that this action had been barred by the two
year statute of limitations. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for
the two year period previous to the bringing of the action, with a dictum that
successive actions would be allowed. Trinity Portland Cement Co. v. Horton
(1gig, Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 510.
It has generally been held that wherever the conduct of a business has caused
damage to individual rights and private property, and the cause of such damage
was "permanent," only one action would lie, the damage being the decrease in the
market value of the land affected. Geer v. Durham Water Co. (19oo) 127 N. C.
349, 37 S. E. 474 (diveision of water). But where the cause of the damage was
not "permanent" successive actions would be allowed, as on a nuisance, to
recover the damages accruing between each suit, continuing damage being of the
essence of a nuisance. Platt Bros. & Co. v. Waterbury (1907) 8o Conn. 179,
67 At. 5o8; Turner v. Brooks & Sons (1912) I5I Ky. 310, 151 S. W. 948 (rocks
blasted into a river). The difficulty arises from the confusion of the cases as
to the meaning of the word "permanent." Structures erected by public service
corporations under charter from the state have been held to be "permanent"
Chicago N. S. St. Ry. v. Payne (19O) 192 Ill. 239, 61 N. E. 467; cf. Louisville
& N. R. R. v. Lambert (19o8, Ky. Ct. App.) 11o S. W. 305. The New York
court has held that structures erected under special sanction of the legislature
were not properly nuisances, but wherever any structure, not erected under such
legislative permission, caused damage, it was a nuisance and successive actions
would lie. Uline v. New York C. & H. R. R. R. (1886) ioi N. Y. 98, 4 N. E.
536. This has been considered a leading case on the subject. Several courts,
however, have adopted other standards, such as the physical character of the
structure. Cf. Troy v. Cheshire R. R. (185o) 23 N. H. 83; cf. Powers v. Council
Bluffs (1877) 45 Iowa, 652. However, there has been a tendency toward adopt-
ing the classification made in the New York case, even in those states which pre-
viously followed another rule. Cf. Irvine v. Oelwein (1915) 170 Iowa, 653, 150
N. W. 674. It seems that the better test is that of legislative license as applied
by the New York court. The decision in the principal case demonstrates the
ease with which it can be applied.
RECENT CASE NOTES
TRIAL-EXAMINING JUROR-INDEMNITY INsURANcE.In an action for personal
injuries brought by an employee against his employer, while examining the jury
panel upon their voir dire, the counsel for the plaintiff asked each prospective
juror whether or not he would be prejudiced by knowledge that the X company
was an insurer against any injury to the defendant's employees. These questions
were admitted over the objections by the opposing counsel, who appealed. Held,
that this was a reversible error, since such conduct constituted a basis for an
inference that defendant had indemnity insurance. Arnold v. California Portland
Cement Co. (1gig, Calif.) 183 Pac. 171.
It is well settled that in this class of actions a jury should not be allowed to
consider the fact that the employer is insured against accidents to his employees.
Sawyer v. Arnold Shoe Co. (1897) go Me. 369, 38 Atl. 333; Herrin v. Daly
(1902) 80 Miss. 340, 31 So. 79o. But as a basis for the examination of the jurors
on the voir dire, evidence may be offered to show that an insurance company is
interested in the outcome of the action. Egner v. Curtis, Fowle & Paine Co.
(914) 96 Neb. 18, 146 N. W. 1o32; Archer v. Skahen (1917) 137 Minn. 432,
163 N. W. 784. For if a juror has a direct pecuniary interest in a company
insuring the defendant against injury to his employees, he is subject to a chal-
lenge for cause. Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. See (1913) 182 Ala. 561,
62 So. I9. This information is also necessary to enable the counsel to use
intelligently his peremptory challenges. Foley v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1903)
I1g Iowa, 246, 93 N. W. 284; Spoonick v. Backus-Brooks Co. (19O3) 89 Minn.
354, 94 N. W. 1079. All the courts recognize that evidence admitted for the sole
purpose of providing a basis for the examination of prospective jurors is likely
to be misused, and consequently it is universally required that the counsel's ques-
tions be asked in good faith. Pekin, Stone & Mfg. Co. v. Ramey (1912) o4
Ark. 1, 147 S. W. 83; Camp v. Churchill (1914) i86 Ala. 173, 65 So. 336. The
instant case is in accord with the holdings of some courts which hold that the
examination of the jurors must be so conducted as not to imply that. defend-
ant is insured against liability. Odell v. Genesee Const. Co. (1911) 145 App. Div.
125, 129 N. Y. Supp. 122; Mithen v. Jeffery (1913) 259 Ill. 372, 1O2 N. E. 778.
It is submitted that the better view does not so restrict the counsel in his
examination. Swift v. Platte (19o3) 68 Kan. 1O, 74 Pac. 635; Viou v. Brooks-
Scanlon Lumber Co. (i9o6) 99 Minn. 97, io8 N. W., 89I. For it is difficult to
understand how a counsel could intelligently examine jurors, unless the fact as
to the existence of liability insurance, the particular company writing it, its local
agents, etc., are disclosed to the jury panel.
TRIAL-NEw TRiA--IMPSSIBILITY OF PROCURING RECORD OF TRAi.-The appel-
lants were convicted of a crime in the court below and took the usual proceed-
ings to appeal. Due to the death of the court stenographer, a transcript of the
proceedings could not be obtained. A motion was then made to the Supreme
Court asking that a new trial be directed on the ground that they could not be
heard on appeal from the judgment rendered. Held, that the court had no power
to grant the motion. State v. Ricks (I919, Idaho) i8o Pac. 257.
There is a sharp conflict of authority whether or not a new trial will be granted
where the party has lost the benefit of regularly taken exceptions through no
fault or negligence of his own. Those courts whose creation and jurisdiction
depend entirely upon statute refuse a new trial, except under circumstances
named in the statute. Stenographer Cases (9o5) oo Me. 271, 61 At. 782.
Other jurisdictions, as in the instant case, deny such relief on the theory that
the right to a new trial is purely statutory and is to be granted upon certain
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conditions with which the appellant must strictly comply. Etchells v. Wainwright
(1904) 76 Conn. 534, 57 Atl. 121. Some courts also seem to base the denial of a
new trial in such cases on policy. Cf. Bingman v. Clark (1916) 178 Iowa, 1129,
159 N. W. 172. The majority view, however, in both civil and criminal cases,
affords the appellant relief where the record necessary for a review of the case is
lost or unobtainable. These courts allow a new trial as a matter of justice and as
within the inherent or incidental powers of the court, not based upon a statutory
provision. Bailey v. United States (igog) 3 Okla. Cr. App. 175, 104 Pac. 917;
Cf. Richardson v. State (19o7) I5 Wyo. 465, 89 Pac. lO27. A few jurisdictions
have arrived at the same conclusion by a liberal construction of the statutory
grounds for appeal. Nelson v. Marshall (1904) 77 Vt. 44, 58 AtI. 793. It seems
that this might readily have been done in the principal case. In civil cases, much
may be said in favor of the rule in the instant case, because it would not be
equitable to transfer the hardship of the appellant to the appellee, in addition to
compelling him to undergo the expense of a second trial. However, in criminal
cases, both principle and policy support the majority doctrine. No property
rights would be interfered with; the state is simply exacting punishment. It is
submitted that it is a mockery of justice to deny the appellant any opportunity
of relief on a mere technicality in a criminal case.
TRUSTS-CHARITABLE TRUSTs-TRuST FOR "BENEVOLENT PURPOSES" UNCERTAIN
AND VOID.-A gift was made by will to trustees of a church in trust to use the
income "for support of the church or such benevolent purposes as the trustees
of said church shall direct." Held, that as the trustees had discretion to use for
benevolent purposes which would include purposes not strictly charitable, the gift
was not a charitable trust and was therefore void for uncertainty. Smith v. Pond
(1919, N. J. Ch.) 1O7 AtI. 8o0.
The court correctly held that general discretion given a trustee to select any
charity does not render the trust void. Re Pardue [19o6] 2 Ch. 184; Gill v.
Atty. Gen. (19o8) 197 Mass. 232, 83 N. E. 676; see Re Dulles (1907) 218 Pa.
St. 162, 167, 67 AtI. 49, also 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1177, note. Contra, Bristol v.
Bristol (885) 53 Conn. 242, 5 AtI. 687 (by a divided court) ; Hadley v. Forsee
(1907) 203 Mo. 418, 101 S. W. 59; see also 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49, note. Its
holding that where a non-charitable purpose is included with a charitable pur-
pose the entire trust fails, since the trustees cannot be compelled, against the
donor's intent, to apply the fund to the charitable purpose, likewise accords
with the authorities. Morice v Durham (I804, Eng. Ch.) 9 Ves. 399, 1o Ves.
522; Minot v. Atty. Gen. (195o) 189 Mass. 176, 75 N. E. 149; cases collected,
Ii C. J. 330. The court was bound by previous authorities in New Jersey to
hold that "benevolent" was more inclusive than "charitable," although it was
strongly of the impression that in so doing it was frustrating the wishes of the
testatrix. It would seem more in accord with the probable intention of testators
to hold "benevolent," as here used, synonymous with "charitable," and this
has been so held. Suter v. Hilliard (1852) 132 Mass. 412; Fox v. Gibbs (1893)
86 Me. 87, 29 Atl. 94o; see Re Hinckley (1881) 58 Calif. 457, 5o7. But a result
similar to that of the principal case has been reached in other cases. Adye v.
Smith (1876) 44 Conn. 6o; James v. Allen (1817, Eng. Ch.) 3 Meriv. 17, 36
Reprint, 7; see 7 C. J. 1140, 1141; also Sanger, Remoteness and Charitable Gifts
(1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 46.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION-EXECUTORS-SETTLEMfENT OF ACCOUNT-AToR-
NEyS' FEEs.-An executor employed a firm of attorneys to prosecute an action
to recover damages for the wrongful death of his testator. It was agreed that
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the attorneys should receive a contingent fee of one-third of the amount recov-
ered. Approximately $82,ooo was recovered, one-third of which the executor
paid the attorneys. He then filed his account and instituted proceedings for its
judicial settlement. Objections were raised by the beneficiaries on the ground
that the sum paid for attorneys' fees was unreasonable. The surrogate appointed
a referee who found $15,500 to be a reasonable compensation. Held, that the
executor should be credited with only that amount. Shearn, J. dissenting. In re
Meng (igig, App. Div.) 176 N. Y. Supp. 29o.
It is settled beyond dispute that an executor cannot bind the estate by his con-
tract, although it was made in the interest and for the benefit of the estate.
Austin v. Munro (1872) 47 N. Y. 360; Plait v. Platt (1887) io5 N. Y. 488,
12 N. E. 22. But he may bring an action for the wrongful death of the testator
and, of course, is expected to employ counsel. A state statute provided, in the
instant case, that "the reasonable expenses of the action may be fixed by the
surrogate . . . and may be deducted from the recovery." The question arises
as of what time this reasonableness is to be determined. In tort actions, the
standard of reasonableness of a man's action is applied as of the time when the
tort occurred, not on what are later found to be the facts. See Holmes, The
Common, Law (1881) III. If the analogy is applied to cases like the instant
one, it would seem that the reasonableness of the attorneys' fee must be deter-
mined as of the time when the contract was made, and not after recovery in the
action. The majority of the court appears to have disregarded this point, which
was made in the dissenting opinion. In this respect, it is believed that the deci-
sion of the majority was erroneous. It is agreed, however, that the estate was
not bound by the contract. Contingent fees are usual in this class of cases, and
fees even of more than thirty-three and one-third per cent. have been held to be
reasonable in actions of the same nature. Cf. In re Weber (1918, Surr. Ct)
1o2 Misc. 635, i7o N. Y. Supp. 293. Therefore, it is submitted that the con-
tingent fee agreed upon in the principal case was reasonable at the time the
contract was made, and that the surrogate should have been precluded, in the
absence of fraud, etc., from holding otherwise. If the rule laid down in the
present case is adopted, it would be difficult for an executor to protect himself in
similar circumstances. A trustee may limit his liability on contracts made in
behalf of the estate to the amount that he will be reimbursed from the estate.
See (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 725, 739. This doctrine has been upheld in the case
(.f a contract for the service of attorneys employed by a trustee. Brackett v.
Ostrander (i9o8) 126 App. Div. 529, iio N. Y. Supp. 779. But even if the doc-
trine were extended to include executors, there would be the practical difficulty
of obtaining competent attorneys on such a basis of compensation. An estate in
course of administration has not the credit and standing of a business trust. It
would seem, then, for practical reasons, that the statute should be interpreted as
indicated above.
